The impact of multiple framing cues on promotion success: Evidence from an experiment in an online Pay What You Want context by Flagan, Mikko
The impact of multiple framing cues on promotion
success: Evidence from an experiment in an online Pay
What You Want context
Marketing
Master's thesis
Mikko Flagan
2012
Department of Marketing
Aalto University
School of Economics
Powered by TCPDF (www.tcpdf.org)
 1 
 
 
Author:  Mikko R. Flagan 
Title of thesis:  The impact of multiple framing cues on promotion success: Evidence from an 
experiment in an online Pay What You Want context 
Degree:  Master of Science of Marketing 
Degree programme:  Marketing 
Thesis advisor(s):  Parvinen Petri,  Pöyry Essi  
Year of approval:  2012 Number of pages:  66 Language:  English 
Abstract 
 
Participative pricing mechanisms have become increasingly popular among companies. A specific 
type of this mechanism called “pay what you want” (PWYW) seems to be a desirable way of 
increasing sales revenues. In particular, using the mechanism for online services has proven to be 
successful as the internet offers a flexible platform for it and as the role of variable costs is minimal 
in online services. However, as many social influence strategies work differently in physical and 
online worlds, there needs to be a thorough understanding of how framing a PWYW offering 
affects the prices that consumers are willing to pay. Specifically, the authors look at how reference 
price, promotion availability and payment anonymity affect consumers’ price estimates and 
purchase and search intentions for an online game bundle in an experimental setting. The results 
show that the variables have an interactive effect on the price consumers would pay for the games 
and on consumers’ purchase intentions. Out of the main effects, high reference price affects 
consumers’ price estimates the most.        
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1 INTRODUCTION 
With the growth of the online marketplace, pricing has gained new interest among practitioners 
and academics.  Online business models, complex service offerings, and digitally consumed 
goods allow for the creation of new pricing strategies and for the use of traditional pricing 
strategies for new product and service categories. Dynamic pricing, participative pricing, name-
your-own-price, and pay-what-you-want pricing mechanisms have all shown to be successful 
and increasingly popular online.  Participative pricing mechanisms represent such pricing 
vehicles as they involve consumers in the price-setting process (Kim et al. 2009) and can 
effectively be used in online environments. Auctions are a typical example of participative 
pricing – the pricing decisions made by the buyer strongly influence the final price set by the 
seller. While these mechanisms have long been in place in traditional physical settings, they are 
now being applied to online environment and to digital goods and services. Online auctions, for 
example, have taken multiple forms that are usable only in digital channels. “Pay what you 
want” (PWYW), a distinct case of participative pricing, provides interesting opportunities to 
differentiate from competitors in online businesses. It delegates the whole price determination to 
the buyer, which means that the customer can choose to pay whatever price, even zero (Kim et 
al. 2009). PWYW helps to draw attention to the product offering and thereby get new customers.  
Traditional physical businesses are many times restricted or influenced by high variable costs, 
clear reference price perceptions, and physical presence of other customers and employees 
therefore there are only few examples of the use of PWYW in the offline world. Some examples 
would be charitable giving and self-service for highly inexpensive consumer goods. On the 
contrary, the internet provides completely new applications to this pricing strategy.  The 
flexibility of the internet enables innovative sales and pricing of products and services. New 
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digital goods bear less fixed price perceptions in consumers’ minds and often low variable costs 
related to online services allow for varying kind of pricing strategies.  
Despite the fact that the actual usage of PWYW in physical settings is scarce, the research on the 
mechanism has been applied to offline contexts; Kim et al. (2009) studied PWYW in offline 
retail contexts while Gneezy et al. (2010) studied it in an offline charitable giving context. 
PWYW online contexts have also been studied for the purpose of gaining knowledge of 
consumer behaviors and responses. Racherla et al. (2011) studied the effects of privacy 
assurances and social information on consumer payments for PWYW priced mobile applications.  
Data collected from an online PWYW music label was studied by Regner et al. (2010) to 
understand why customers pay voluntarily.  Implementation of a PWYW promotion can be 
difficult as it provides an opportunity for consumers to “exploit” the company by paying nothing 
for the offered product or service and, at the same time, the company needs to generate revenues 
from selling the items.  The framing of the offering seems to play a crucial role in customer 
responses and how much they are willing pay.  For example, Gneezy et al. (2010) acknowledged 
this fact by showing that shared social responsibility increases PWYW revenues over traditional 
corporate social responsibility appeals. Therefore, this study focuses on offering framings in 
selling an online service with the PWYW pricing mechanism. We aim to provide understanding 
of PWYW in the digital environment as well as show how framing of different variables of the 
promotion can alter consumers’ responses to it.  Besides contributing to existing PWYW and 
participative pricing literature, the results of this study give managerial insight to the successful 
launch of PWYW promotions and how to get customers to pay a higher price. 
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2 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
Bakos (1998) discussed the emerging role of electronic marketplaces on the internet.  Markets 
create value for buyers, sellers, intermediaries, and society.  There has been a dramatic increase 
in the role of information technology in traditional and electronic marketplaces.  Information 
technology has then increased effectiveness and reduced transaction costs creating ‘friction-free’ 
markets.  The matching function of a market then creates a bilateral relationship between the 
buyer and seller.  Once the transaction is completed, the product must be transported to the buyer 
and the payment transferred to the seller.  The internet marketplaces have reduced these costs, 
especially in the case of information goods.  Digital information goods allow for perfect copies 
to be created and distributed almost without cost.   
Sai (2010) discussed digital goods for the purpose of understanding how their characteristics 
may have an impact on their prices and price setting mechanisms.  They have no loss in quality 
during duplication, they take negligible storage space, they can be offered with timely delivery, 
and they have easy transferring and processing.  The aspects facilitate the creation of new online 
marketplaces and friction free markets.    These friction free markets will lead to greater price 
competition and ultimately lower prices and better value for customers (Dolan and Moon 2000).  
Digitization in a sense, has changed none of the fundamental rules of pricing, however, price 
structures developed to fit older generations of products will not apply to the digital world 
(Doctors et al. 2010).  
 Companies must change with the times and accept that their pricing strategies must continue to 
reflect market price drivers, even if prices are diminishing in the friction free markets.  The 
dynamic of these friction free markets are not as attractive for sellers who relied on geography or 
 7 
 
consumer ignorance to insulate them from low-cost sellers in the market (Bakos 1998).  New 
sources of product and marketing differentiation will become much more important.  Sotgiu and 
Ancarani (2004) argued however, that the internet is not driving down prices and is instead 
helping companies to become smarter in their pricing strategies.  Smart pricing can be achieved 
by exploiting different customer value perceptions among different retail channels by exploring 
new pricing opportunities. We will now discuss some of these new pricing options and the role 
of framing of those promotional offers.   
 
2.1 Dynamic pricing 
Some new forms of pricing that companies are using to differentiate themselves are dynamic 
pricing and participative pricing.  Name your own price and PWYW mechanisms can be seen as 
both dynamic and participative pricing. Dynamic pricing includes some of the same behavior 
determining characteristics as PWYW and other pricing models.  Dynamic pricing allows for 
identical products and services to be sold with different prices (Lee et al. 2011, Xia et al. 2004).  
It can be defined as a pricing strategy in which prices change either over time, across consumers, 
or across product/service bundles (Kannan and Kopalle 2001).  Online auctions are the most 
common formats of dynamic pricing discussed and they allow buyers to actively take part in the 
pricing decision.   
Lee et al. (2011) studied factors affecting perceived price fairness of buyers in online dynamic 
pricing context.  The two factors discovered where the illusion of control and lateral consumer 
relationship.  Illusion of control is based on the two elements of ‘intention to achieve the 
outcome’ and ‘perceived connection between ones actions and the desired outcome’ (Lee et al. 
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2011, Thomson 1999). Consumers must participate in the transaction to perceive the control and 
the perceived control leads to greater perceived fairness of the price.  The lateral consumer 
relationship then refers to the price perception that comes from comparative processes.  
Consumers compare the price they paid to the price others paid for a similar or identical product.  
They then base their perceived fairness of price on that comparison.  Both illusion of control and 
lateral relationship significantly influenced perception of price fairness.  This perception of price 
fairness then was shown to be a strong predictor of purchase intention.   
 
2.2 Participative pricing 
Participative pricing then involves not just the changing of prices, but with actual consumer 
control over prices. Kim et al. (2009) classified different forms of participative pricing 
mechanisms in terms of the type of interaction: horizontal interactions between several buyers 
and/or several sellers, and one buyer and one seller interactions.  Horizontal interactions include 
classic auctions, reverse auctions, and exchanges.  One-to-one participative pricing interactions 
include negotiations, NYOP, and PWYW.  Chandran (2003) discussed consumer responses to 
these participative pricing interactions compared to responses to fixed pricing mechanisms.  
Participative pricing was defined as mechanisms in which consumers participate in the process 
of determining the price.  It was shown how strategic use of these mechanisms can stimulate 
demand.  By participating in pricing, consumers perceive control over the process.  Participation 
then necessitates thinking about how and when to participate, but consumers also act in service 
of that ‘sub-goal.’  This process is implemental in nature which leads to higher behavioral 
commitment in terms of intent to purchase.  The consumers are focusing on setting the final 
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price, an action, rather than evaluation of the deal.  It has been shown that consumers who have 
experienced participative pricing generally prefer it over posted prices and it attracts consumers 
attention drawing new customers (Chandran and Morwitz 2005).  Again, buyer control seems to 
play a large part in this.  In PWYW buyers’ control over price setting is set at a maximum (Kim 
et al. 2009). 
 
2.3 Name-your-own-price mechanism 
Another example of a participative pricing mechanism that has been widely successful on the 
internet has been the application of ‘name your own price’ business models.  Generally in the 
form of auctions, NYOP retailers allow buyers to set the final price, however unlike PWYW 
models, the seller can reject the final price if it is below an undisclosed threshold (Kim et al. 
2009).  Sellers hope to extract the maximum buyer surplus by getting consumers to pay the 
highest price they are willing over their own marginal cost of the item (Spann and Tellis 2006).  
Consumers are shown to not always act rationally and that irrationality can be exploited for 
profit.  Due to the lack of frictional costs associated with online shopping, consumers can be 
drawn to these innovative pricing experiences.  These frictional costs include the disutility of 
investing time and effort for interacting with a website and the disutility of interacting with user 
interfaces (Hann and Terwiesch 2003).  By creating easy to use NYOP and PWYW online sites, 
customers can be drawn to them and persuaded to make a purchase.  This lack of frictional costs 
allows the NYOP format to soften competition (Fay 2009).  Because many products sold online 
are similar to each other, marketers can utilize NYOP models to differentiate themselves from 
rivals, relaxing price competition.  The same effect can apply to PWYW situations.   
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The framing of NYOP mechanisms can involve several different forms of cues.  Cues such as 
references prices and brand and product information are all used in consumers’ evaluations of a 
NYOP promotion.  Chernev (2003) showed that consumer’s must be able to articulate their 
perceived product utility in monetary terms in order to generate a price.  Provided reference 
prices facilitate this price generation process.  They can serve as a benchmark from which the 
product value estimation can be derived.  Advertised reference prices can also signal the value 
that the seller places on the product (Kamins et al. 2004).  The retailer can use market research 
data to obtain information of consumers’ reserve prices (Wilson 2008) and from this create 
optimal framing strategies. 
The study conducted by Kamins et al. (2004) also involved the effects of seller supplied 
reference prices on buyers’ product evaluations in internet auctions.  Marketer supplied 
descriptions of price serve as an anchor for a buyer’s formation of a new reference price.  In a 
promotional context, consumers compare the sale price to the higher advertised price, e.g. 
regular price or list price.  Buyers then adjust their bid price based on these reference prices.  
However it is shown that in NYOP promotions, the perceived value of the item for bid is also 
influenced by other price cues that are constantly changing, mainly the bids of those competing 
for the same product.  This makes it difficult to put a weight on the influence of each cue 
individually.  This study hopes to shed some light onto the interactive effects of multiple price 
and non-monetary cues framed in different ways.   
Wolk and Spann (2008) discussed the effects of reference prices on bidding behavior for these 
interactive pricing mechanisms.  They analyzed whether retailers can positively influence bid 
values by providing an advertised reference price.  Consumer purchase behavior is said to be 
influenced by three types of reference prices.  The internal reference price of the consumer is 
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based on prices consumers have seen in the past and estimated fair prices for the product or 
service.  This internal reference price can then be affected by advertised reference prices 
provided by the seller or by external reference prices often found through external price 
searching.  These factors change however in the case of NYOP auctions.  The consumer no 
longer faces a posted price to judge the sale price against.  There is no actual price for the 
consumer to compare to the reference price.  Instead the reference price plays a more important 
role in situations of product uncertainty.  It influences the process in which the bid value is 
formed and the decision to take part in the auction.  Consumers’ uncertainty about their product 
valuation and accuracy of their internal reference price can be relieved by a sellers providing of a 
suggested retail price.  They can also conduct searches for external reference prices.  As a result, 
the final bid value will depend on multiple sources of price and product information.  This paper 
hopes to show how provided reference price can be used in conjunction with non-monetary cues 
to influence consumers into paying more than the minimum.   
 
2.4 Pay-what-you-want pricing mechanism 
PWYW pricing models are classified as participative pricing mechanisms that utilize buyer’s 
participation in determining the price.  Kim et al. (2009) defined PWYW as a participative 
pricing mechanism that delegates the whole price determination to the buyer.  Buyers decide the 
price on goods being offered under PWYW conditions by the seller.  Once the price has been set 
by the buyer, the transaction then automatically proceeds and the buyer must accept the price.   
This mechanism gives full control over pricing to the buyer.  Consumers whose perceived 
control of pricing is high tend to demonstrate higher intention to purchase (Chandran and 
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Morwitz 2005).  Consumers who have an implemental rather than deliberative mind-set tend to 
have greater purchase intentions.  This is driven by the desire to set the final price rather than to 
evaluate the deal.  This mind-set of the consumer can be manipulated through the framing of the 
participative pricing promotion to be more implemental.  Those that experience participative 
pricing mechanisms generally prefer them to traditional pricing mechanisms that have a 
predetermined price.     
Although participative pricing and PWYW pricing mechanisms are not new to consumers, the 
application of them to new products or services can be seen as innovative.  Innovative pricing 
strategies can be utilized by marketing strategists to differentiate their company from the 
competition.  The innovativeness of the promotion can attract consumers’ attention and increase 
potential customer awareness.  Participative pricing mechanisms have already proved successful 
in online marketplaces, most notably with online auction sites.  Online auctions can be classified 
as name your own pricing (NYOP) mechanisms.  These differ from PWYW mechanisms in that 
the seller has the right to reject a buyer’s bid should it fall below an undisclosed threshold (Kim 
et al. 2009).  PWYW mechanisms have also been appearing in online environments and for 
digital goods.  The success of Radiohead’s release of the album, In Rainbows, under PWYW 
conditions has spurned new examples of the mechanism and provided new avenues for pricing 
and consumer behavior research.  Through successful framing of the promotion and offering of a 
highly regarded product, the band was able to convince consumers to pay more than the 
minimum price of zero.  
Kim et al. (2009) showed that the final price paid by the consumer depends on the consumer’s 
internal reference price and the proportion of that reference price they are willing to discharge to 
the seller.  The proportion discharged reflects the buyer’s fairness, satisfaction, price 
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consciousness, and income.  By utilizing PWYW the seller shows that they are confident in the 
quality of their product.  A quality product and proper framing of a PWYW mechanism should in 
turn yield a higher than minimum price paid by the consumer.   Limited research has been 
conducted on the framing of a PWYW pricing mechanism to influence prices paid.   
Marett et al. (2012) studied PWYW in an online setting involving purchases from iTunes 
marketplace.  They studied the possibility that the price a buyer is willing to pay for a digital 
product and the price actually paid can differ based on social and economic factors.  The 
exploratory look was based on Social Exchange Theory that centers on the relationship between 
mutually beneficial partners.  In a participative pricing environment such as PWYW, the social 
and economic factors between buyers and sellers must be mutually beneficial for the long-term 
survival of the relationship.  One person does another a favor with an expectation of some future 
reciprocation.  Customers that seek to repeatedly gain the benefits provided by the vendor will be 
socially motivated to provide economic incentive to the vendor.  Paying over zero then signals 
that the consumer would like to have the PWYW offer to be available again (Marett et al. 2012, 
Gneezy et al. 2010).   Gneezy et al. (2012) investigated the role of identity and self-image 
consideration under PWYW pricing environments.  Results from their field experiments (Gneezy 
et al. 2010) show that often, when granted the opportunity to pay what they want, fewer 
customers choose to buy it than when the price is fixed and low.  This decision to not purchase is 
driven by an individual’s identity and self-image concerns.  These consumers feel bad when they 
pay less than the ‘appropriate price’ causing them to pass on the opportunity to purchase. 
Because they care about their self-image, if they do purchase, they will pay more than the 
minimum.  Levitt (2006) showed that willingness to pay was driven by issues of right and wrong 
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and fairness rather than standard economic concepts such as self-interest in the case of bagels 
and donuts distributed under an honor system.   
Riener and Traxler (2011) studied how moods affect short-term fluctuations in prices paid for 
PWYW pricing in a restaurant.  Their study differed from most PWYW studies in that they did 
not include any explicitly posted prices that could serve as a reference.  They showed that long-
term profitability is possible for PWYW vendors despite short-term fluctuations due to mood.  
Regner (2010) investigated why consumers pay voluntarily in a PWYW environment involving 
an online vendor of music sold digitally.  The purpose of the study was to show the underlying 
motivations to pay more than the minimum price including reciprocity, altruism, social-image 
concerns, guilt, and social norms triggered by an explicitly posted reference price.  Reciprocity 
was shown to be the strong motivation for participants to pay more than the minimum.  Guilt was 
also a significant driver.  Being inclined to follow social norms creates the desire to pay around 
the recommended price.  Payments similar to the posted reference price were shown to be the 
most common.  Racherla et al. (2011) studied PWYW pricing for mobile applications to see the 
effects of social information and privacy assurances.  Customer adoption of mobile applications 
is generally based on app utility and social information as well as negatively influenced by the 
perceived risk associated with disclosing privacy information.  Customers’ intent to purchase and 
the price they are willing to pay is shown to be positively influenced by social information such 
as number of other purchasers and the prices they paid.  Gautier and Van der Klaauw (2010) 
studied voluntary and non-voluntary participants in a PWYW pricing situation involving a 
night’s stay in a hotel.  PWYW pricing was shown to require loyal fans for success and should 
involve a product that is non-rival and non-excludable.  Our study hopes to add insight into 
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PWYW pricing for digital goods and how successful framing of the promotion can increase 
desire to purchase and the amount paid.     
 
2.5 Framing of decisions 
Explanations and prediction of people’s choices is often based on the assumption of human 
rationality.  These rational choices are generally thought to satisfy requirements of consistency 
and coherence.  People however do not always follow these requirements and systematically 
violate them (Tversky and Kahneman 1981).  Psychological principles govern the perception of 
decision problems and the evaluation of options.   
Tversky and Kahneman (1981) described a decision problem as defined by the acts or options 
among which one must choose, the possible outcomes or consequences of these acts, and the 
contingencies or conditional probabilities that relate outcomes to acts.  The ‘decision frame’ is 
then the decision-makers conception of the acts, outcomes and contingencies associated with a 
particular choice.  This decision frame is controlled be the formulation of the problem as well as 
by the norms, habits, and personal characteristics of the decision maker.  When facing a choice, 
the decision maker will choose the option with the highest expected utility.  This choice process 
involves an initial phase in which acts, outcomes, and contingencies are framed.  This frame is 
then evaluated before choosing.  Previous research has studied framing effects on monetary and 
non-monetary sales promotions (Campbell and Diamond 1990). Generally they follow the ideas 
of prospect theory in that the positive framing of problems emphasizes benefits, while negative 
framing emphasizes risks.  When contemplating benefits, decision makers generally minimize 
risks.  When they contemplate risks, they tend to eliminate risks even if the costs are high 
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(Gamliel and Herstein 2011, Kahneman and Tversky 1979).  This paper will focus on the general 
term of framing relating to different presentations of objects of a promotion rather than to the 
more rigid definition used by Gamliel and Herstein (2012) relating to presentation of an identical 
object of a promotion in complementary manners.    
The framing of sales promotions has been discussed and has generally shown that consumers do 
not always make rational decisions and are highly sensitive to contextual cues in information 
supplied in price offers (Sinha and Smith 2000).  Levin et al. (1998) created a typology of 
framing effects including risky choice, attribute, and goal framing.  These three types of framing 
are governed by different processes and are thus independent of each other.  This study hopes to 
shed more light into this subject of interdependence between different framing aspects in the 
same promotion.   
Proper framing of a pricing promotion can lead to greater purchase intentions and lessen search 
intentions (for alternative products or better prices) of consumers. Gamliel and Herstein (2011) 
studied how framing of a promotion affects consumers’ purchase intentions.  It was shown that 
consumers in negative framing conditions would be more willing to purchase the product offered 
at a discounted sale price.  McKechnie et al. (2012) examined the framing effects of discount 
presentation in comparative price advertising in low price and high price contexts.  They studied 
identical discounts presented in percentage and absolute terms (attribute framing) and showed 
that they indeed result in different consumer perceptions of transaction value and purchase 
intentions.  Effects of discount framing were found to be influenced by discount size in the case 
of low price product context, but not in the high price one.  The largest effects were shown to be 
determined by factors which managers can control such as ‘deal characteristics’ and ‘price 
presentation factors’ as opposed to situational factors.  Many other studies have focused on this 
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absolute versus percentage framing.  Chen et al. (1998) found that price reductions framed in 
percentage terms rather than dollar amounts was more significant for high-priced products and 
the opposite was found for low-priced products.  Gendall et al. (2006) showed that when this 
price or price discount is the only cue available for the subject, it is overemphasized in their 
responses.  Consumers were shown to be more influenced by other cues such as brand and 
amount of discount rather than influenced by the different framings.   
Inman et al. (1997) studied the framing of promotions with the presence of restrictions to 
accentuate deal value.  Consumers have several sources of information that they can consider 
when evaluating a deal, e.g. depth of discount, the brand, and presence of special displays.  The 
presence of a restriction and its framing operate to activate a cognitive resource that is used in 
rendering offering favorableness.  When no other information is present, the framing of a 
restriction leads to an inference of ‘good value’.  However, when other value information is 
available, the restriction can stimulate either favorable or unfavorable judgments.  It was shown 
that the effect of these restrictions is not unified across all conditions because the effect is 
modified by the presence of other framing variables.  This study intends to show some of these 
effects of other variables in PWYW situations that can be applied to the framing of all types of 
promotions.     
Most previous framing research pertains to traditional pricing promotions (e.g. discounts, 30% 
off, buy one get one free, limit two per customer) and has had little reach into innovative pricing 
mechanisms such as PWYW.  This study intends to discover how the framing of a PWYW 
promotion affects customers’ responses, including paying more than the minimum, and purchase 
and search intentions.  Regner (2010) studied an online PWYW promotional site that sells digital 
music to find underlying motivations to pay more than the minimum. Reciprocity, altruism, 
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social-image concerns, guilt, and social norms were all shown to be triggered by an explicitly 
shown reference price.  The proper framing of a reference price drives people to pay around the 
amount of the recommended price.    Gautier and Van der Klaauw (2010) studied sample 
selection in a field experiment with voluntary payments for a nights stay at a hotel.  Voluntary 
and non-voluntary participants were subjected to different framings of reference prices.  Only 
non-voluntary participants were shown to respond to changes in explicitly shown reference price.  
To be successful, a PWYW promotion needs to have loyal fans who want to support the cause 
and the product sold should be non-rival and non-excludable.     
 
3 RESEARCH FRAMEWORK 
This study investigates consumer reactions to online PWYW pricing mechanisms.  The research 
framework is based on previous studies of PWYW.  Kim et al. (2009) studied several settings 
with PWYW pricing mechanisms and various influence strategies.  Gneezy et al. (2010) studied 
social responsibility through a field experiment in PWYW and charitable giving.  This study will 
give understanding to how consumers perceive PWYW promotions online but also give insight 
into how the framing of the promotion affects the purchase reactions of the consumer (Tversky 
and Kahneman 1981).  Understanding how consumers react to different setups of PWYW 
campaigns will result in more pertinent managerial implications.  Reference price, availability of 
promotion, and anonymity of payment were chosen as PWYW promotion features.  Price (price 
they would pay, estimated market price, and fair price), search intentions and purchase intentions 
were chosen as consumer reaction variables.  Figure 1 illustrates this research framework. 
 
 19 
 
Figure 1. Research framework 
 
 
 
 
 
3.1 Reference price 
Reference price is the amount of money a customer thinks a product normally costs.  Consumers 
have expectations about the price of products.  These price expectations, or reference prices, play 
an important role in choice processes   (Kannan and Kopalle 2001).  Reference prices are a 
function of the frequency consumers shop for a product, how standardized the product is, and the 
consumer’s level of involvement in the product being purchased.  Due to reduced search costs, 
prices are perceived to be lower on the internet, and the reference prices for online shoppers are 
also lower.   
In price comparison research, buyers’ judgments of advertised prices depends not only on the 
price, but also on contextual cues within the promotion, situational influences surrounding 
buyers, and on the buyers’ internal reference prices (Grewal et al. 1998)  Internal reference price 
is the price or price scale in buyer’s memories that serves as a basis for judging actual prices.  
These internal reference prices are positively influenced by perceived quality, advertised selling 
price, and advertised reference price.  Advertised reference price has been shown to shift internal 
Reference price 
High / Low 
Promotion availability 
Short / Long 
Payment anonymity 
Anonymous / Public 
 
Price consumer would pay 
Evaluation of the market price 
Evaluation of the fair price 
Purchase intentions 
Search intentions 
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reference prices in their direction.  Perceptions of value (acquisition value and transaction value) 
then increase purchase intentions. 
Chandrashekaran and Grewal (2003) studied how the level of involvement influences the 
assimilation of an advertised reference price into consumers’ existing internal reference prices.  
It was shown that in low involvement situations, consumers are more likely to depend on 
additional heuristics such as presence of a regular price or other semantic and contextual cues.  
These could induce change in the consumers’ internal reference prices regardless of the 
magnitude of discrepancy between internal reference prices and the advertised reference price.  
For successful posting of an advertised reference price, vendors must have adequate knowledge 
of the range of consumers’ internal reference prices in the high and low involvement processes.   
Gwebu et al. (2011) studied how price cues can be used strategically to influence consumers’ 
perceptions and increase the amount that they bid in name your own price auctions.  They 
attempted to show how NYOP auctions can use a price recommendation to persuade consumers 
to bid higher, to improve margins, and attract more buyers to increase sales volume.  They 
studied three levels of price recommendations including a high but implausible recommendation, 
a low but plausible recommendation, and a range price recommendation bounded by the other 
two recommendations.  These framing references prices were all shown to have an anchor effect 
on consumers’ value and bid estimations.  Consumers generally viewed the range and low 
plausible price recommendations as more useful in aiding there decision making than high 
implausible recommendations.  NYOP retailers can increase profit through the provision of 
higher reference prices.  Overinflating this displayed recommended price can have negative 
connotations however which could have severe consequences.   
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Chernev (2003) studied consumers’ willingness to pay in consumer price generation and price 
selection situations.  In these situations as well as in PWYW situations, the consumer must be 
able to articulate their product utility in monetary terms.  The presence of an externally provided 
reference price facilitates this process.  Without a posted reference price, consumers often lack a 
benchmark from which to choose a price to pay.  Price generation processes are moderated by 
readily available reference prices, either internal or external.  Wolk and Spann’s (2008) study of 
the effects of reference prices on bidding behavior found significant influences of different 
reference price concepts on bid values.  It was shown that after controlling for internal and 
external reference prices, sellers only have limited ability to affect bid values through provision 
of an advertised reference price.  The traditional comparative price assessment does not apply in 
interactive pricing situations where a consumer no longer faces a posted price.  The reference 
price posted now plays a more important role in a situation of product value uncertainty.  It can 
influence the process in which bid value is formed and decision on whether or not to take part in 
the auction.  By providing a suggested retail price, a seller can relieve uncertainty of accuracy of 
a consumer’s internal reference price.  Final bid value therefore does not depend on one specific 
price, but on several sources of value information.  Advertised reference price is shown to only 
lessen search intentions when it is perceived as believable.  
Kamins et al. (2004) study of internet auctions discussed the impact of two external reference 
price points that are under a seller’s control on the final price paid.  They studied the framing of 
provided reference prices in terms of high (reserve price) and low (minimum bid) external 
references prices.  The final bid was shown to be greater when the higher external reference price 
was provided.  Providing only a low reference price resulted in less than providing no reference 
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price.  The marketer supplied description of price serves as an anchor for buyers’ formation of 
new reference price.   
McKechnie et al. (2012) examined the framing effects of discount presentation in comparative 
price advertising in low price and high price contexts.  Comparing a sale price with some higher 
reference price in principle enables the retailer to demonstrate that the specific purchase offers 
superior value because of the reduced price.  The value of the offer is then a function of 
acquisition and transaction values as well as the selling price and the consumers’ internal 
reference price.   
Previous PWYW research has indicated two principle components for prices paid: buyers’ 
reference price for the product and the proportion of that reference price the buyer is willing to 
discharge to the seller for that product (Kim et al. 2009).  If a consumer perceives a product as 
being on sale often, their internal reference price decreases (Krishna 1991).   This is due to their 
constructed preferences based on cues to determine willingness to pay.  These cues can be the 
customers’ internal reference price or an external reference price.  Consumers use past 
experiences and provided external prices as these cues.   Price acceptance research shows that 
there is a range of acceptable prices internal to the customer.  If a product’s price is within that 
range then the product is deemed acceptable (Kannan and Kopalle 2001).  The following 
hypotheses are built based on the assumption that the consumers’ reference price has a positive 
relationship with the displayed reference price of the promotion.  
H1a. There is a positive relationship between consumers’ reference price and the price 
they will pay. 
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H1b. There is a positive relationship between consumers’ reference price and their 
purchase intentions 
H1c. There is a negative relationship between consumers’ reference price and their 
search intentions. 
 
3.2 Promotion availability 
Past research on the availability of products or services sold through a pricing promotion has 
generally dealt with consumers’ reactions to scarcity of commodities. Commodities can be made 
more valuable or desirable by manipulating their perceived scarcity (Lynn 1991).  The scarcity 
of these commodities was generally based on limited supply or limited availability.  Sales 
promotions can also seek to create perceptions of scarcity through its framing and semantics.  
Some common examples are ‘limited time only’, ‘one per customer’, or ‘while supplies last’ 
techniques.   A time limited pricing offer is shown to be a form of restriction which increases the 
perceived unavailability or scarcity of the offer (Inman et al. 1997).  Inman et al. (1997) studied 
the role of restrictions when framing a promotion.  They define a restriction as a tactic that 
curtails a consumer’s freedom to purchase a market offering. Presence of a restriction is shown 
to activate a cognitive resource that is used in evaluating an offering.  In the absence of other 
information, the restriction leads to a judgment of ‘good value’.  The effect of the restriction is 
however modified by the presence of other variables.  Our study hopes to add to this research by 
examining the effects of a provided reference price in conjunction with other variables.  Limited 
time offers were shown to increase the transaction value associated with the offer.  Consumers 
use their internal reference price to evaluate these time limited promotions. The correct 
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combination of an ambiguous claim with a vague scarcity restriction can lead to increased 
purchase decisions.  When utilized for an exaggerate price reduction, the combination can lead to 
greater perceived informational value of the offer than one without the scarcity restriction (Tan 
and Chua 2004).   
Cyber promotions with longer time limits result in lower time pressure perceptions and time 
limited cues increase consumer willingness to purchase (Teng and Huang 2007).  Devlin et al. 
(2007) showed that time-limited promotions encourage consumers to end additional searches for 
information. This forces the consumer to buy the product and limits their exposure to 
competition.  Limiting the duration of a promotion has an accelerating effect on purchases made 
by consumers (Aggarwal and Vaidyanathan (2003).  When restrictions are placed on a 
promotional offer, the offer itself becomes a scarce resource enhancing the desire to purchase 
(Aggarwal et al. 2011). 
H2a. There is a negative relationship between amount of time left in the promotion and 
the final price paid by the buyer 
H2b. There is a negative relationship between amount of time left in the promotion and 
purchase intentions of the buyer. 
H2c. There is a positive relationship between the amount of time left in the promotion 
and search intentions of the buyer. 
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3.3 Payment anonymity 
The proven successful PWYW promotion company used as a basis for this study utilizes a 
charity aspect to entice existing customers to pay more than the minimum and to attract potential 
new customers.  The top contributors and the amounts they paid for the product is displayed on 
the PWYW promotion page.  This was chosen as the anonymity feature of the promotions 
framing to be studied.  Previous research on charity donations has consisted mainly of 
physiological needs and personal and social motivations (Proença and Pereira, 2008). Consumers 
contributing to charities or purchasing charity linked goods are shown to be motivated a number 
of needs including social needs (to be a member of a group) and symbolic needs (related to 
symbols of success, status, or power) (Foxall and Goldsmith 1994).  Social shopping and the 
influence of others also play a part on consumer behavior related to charity-linked products 
(Proença and Pereira, 2008).  Gneezy et al. (2011) showed that people care about their self-image 
and therefore pay more than the minimum for products they could get for free in PWYW 
situations.  Monetary incentives are shown to be more effective in increasing charity donations in 
private rather than public settings.  When a customer does choose to pay for a product it serves to 
maintain their positive self-image.  Soetevent (2005) studied anonymity through church 
donations collected by either closed collection bags or open collection baskets.  Non-anonymous 
collecting methods were shown to have a positive impact on contributions to external causes 
(charity) but not on internal causes (public good).  People also shifted to more valuable coins 
when anonymity was removed for internal and external causes.  A consumer is more willing to 
donate to an organization the more likely is the intended audience is to hear about the decision 
(Glazer and Konrad (1996).  Ariely et al. (2009) studied prosocial behavior through charity 
giving.  They showed that people act more prosocially in public rather than private settings.  
 26 
 
Monetary incentives are again shown to only be effective in facilitating private rather than public 
prosocial activity.  People desire to be seen by others when they are doing ‘good.’    
Anonymity of payment has also been studied extensively through economic and dictator games.  
Dictator games usually involve one of the players, the dictator, receiving a sum of money and a 
set of instructions (Aguiar 2008).  The instructions explain that the money has been assigned to 
two players but that only the dictator has the power to disperse amongst them.  Three forms of 
information have a significant impact on the decision behavior of the dictator: information 
related to the dictator or whether or not the decision is visible to others, information the dictator 
receives about the recipient, and information from the game framing and language used in the 
instructions (Aguiar 2008).  The dictators’ behavior can be understood in terms of social or 
moral distance and the outcomes of the experiment change considerably depending on the 
information provided by the experimenters.   
When anonymity is relaxed, information about the dictator is revealed, donations are generally 
higher because of the reduced social distance.  If dictators cannot hide behind anonymity, they 
feel urged to give something, but do not feel obliged to give more (Engel 2011).  Decreasing 
social distance increases other-regarding behavior (Bohnet and Frey 1999).  There can be several 
reasons for this non-selfish behavior.  Alpizar et al. (2007) gave several potential reasons: people 
prefer to conform to what others do, people reciprocate, and people are motivated by their own 
view of themselves and by how others view them.  They show that anonymity does decrease 
contributions as publicly observable contributions significantly increased average contribution. 
They also show how reciprocity affects whether or not participants contribute.  People tend to 
increase their contributions if it is observable that other participants did also.  In terms of 
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anonymity, non-anonymous tests received significantly higher contributions, but in terms of 
reciprocity it increases probability of contributing, but lowers total contribution.   
Haley and Fessler (2005) showed how subtle cues can affect the generosity of participants in 
anonymous economic games.   Decision making processes are affected by both explicit 
propositional knowledge and judgments elicited by the subtle tacit cues.  Reputation formation 
plays a large role in sustaining cooperation and prosocial behavior; however they can only 
explain some of that behavior.  Some individuals are shown to behave in a prosocial behavior 
whether there is a possibility of reputation formation or not.  They show that participants in 
economic games are provided with information that is readily represented as propositional 
statements for use by explicit reasoning process.  However behavior is also determined by 
contextual cues that play a role in more tacit or intuitive assessment of the decision problem.  
They conclude that many types of input relevant to questions of anonymity and observability will 
indeed influence prosocial behavior and that each individual has different sensitivity to these 
inputs.   
Research on the presence of a top contributors list is however, very limited.  Elfenbein and 
McManus (2010) studied prices paid by consumers for charity-linked products through EBay, 
another participative pricing mechanism.  EBay charity auctions include the list of top-
contributors bidding for an item.  These stimulated bidding wars which were shown to increase 
bid sizes for all contributors more so than for the same product sold under non-charity 
mechanisms.  For the purpose of our study, we take it to mean that having the presence of a top 
contributors list is a cue that it is possible for the transaction to not be anonymous, so therefore 
consumers would behave as though the payment is not anonymous.   
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H3a.  Consumers will pay a higher price for promotions with a public display of 
contributors. 
H3b.  Consumers will have greater purchase intentions for promotions with a public 
display of contributors. 
H3c.  Consumers will have less search intentions for promotions with a public display of 
contributors. 
 
3.4 Interaction between variables 
Although it is interesting to study the effect of each independent variable with price paid and 
purchase and search intentions, it is also relevant to see how consumers value each unique 
combination of features.  When combined, features of a promotion can be better perceived as a 
whole than as individual features.  It is possible that the impact of a feature of a promotion can 
be stronger making another feature obsolete (D’Astous and Landreville 2003).  The following 
hypotheses are based on the assumption that the combination with the highest perceived value 
would have a high reference price, a short time period of availability, and be publicly viewed.   
H4a.  When a promotion incorporates a high reference price, has a short amount of time 
left, and is public, consumers will pay a higher price than with any other combination of 
features. 
H4b.  Consumers’ purchase intentions of a promotional offer that incorporates a high 
reference price, has a short amount of time left, and is public, are higher than with any 
other combination of features. 
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H4c.  Consumers’ search intentions of a promotional offer that incorporates a high 
reference price, has a short amount of time left, and is public, are lower than with any 
other combination of features. 
 
4 METHODOLOGY 
The objective of this study was to gain understanding of consumers’ reactions to PWYW sales 
campaigns by experimenting with a fictional campaign based on an already successful online 
PWYW campaign that incorporates different sales promotion features.  In this section we qualify 
the methodological choices and provide understanding of the research sample and setting.   
 
4.1 Research design 
An experiment was conducted with a group of customers (n= 3743) of an existing company that 
utilizes an online PWYW pricing mechanism.  Promotion features were manipulated in a 
between-subjects 2 x 2 x 2 factorial design.  Reference price, promotional availability, and 
anonymity of payment were chosen as influence strategies to be manipulated because they were 
already recognized to be part of the sales mechanism by customers.  The experiment could then 
be seen as consistent with the actual sales webpage and would be fully understood by those 
surveyed.  PWYW promotions were prepared to correspond to the eight (2 x 2 x 2) different 
possibilities the studied features enabled.  This allowed for later examination of how changing 
one feature of the promotion altered consumer reactions.  Each customer was shown only one of 
the tested eight promotions at random.  Between-subject design was chosen because it requires 
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fewer assumptions than research based on a single participant choosing between alternatives 
(Myers and Well, 2003).    
The research was conducted through an online video game sales platform that sells various 
digital games available for download.  The company sells multiple games at a time, combined 
into a video game bundle.  Bundles are sold through a PWYW pricing mechanism that allows for 
customers to pay any price starting from $0.01.  Each bundle is available only for a limited time, 
generally two weeks.   Customers are allowed to divide the price paid between the sales 
company, developers of the games, or to a designated charity.  The online purchase page has 
multiple sources of real-time information that help to influence consumers into paying more than 
$0.01.  These include: the amount of time left of the bundles purchase period, the top ten 
contributors and their amount paid, and a reference price designated “If purchased separately, 
these games would normally cost $X, but we are letting you set the price.”   These framing 
aspects are labeled promotional availability, anonymity of payment, and reference price.   
The same fictitious bundle was utilized for all eight tested promotions, as the aim is to study the 
effects of promotion features rather than the bundle itself.  The bundle was put together using 
graphics from the company’s actual PWYW promotional webpage to keep the look and feel that 
the customer sample was already familiar with.  In all eight alternative PWYW promotions, all 
elements except for the changing features were kept constant.  Figure 2 represents one of the 
eight PWYW promotion bundles.  
 31 
 
Figure 2. Example of one experiment condition
 
 
4.2 Measures and data collection 
The research sample consisted of existing fans and customers of the PWYW service.  Customers 
were recruited to the survey through Twitter.  A Tweet was sent by the company asking 
customers who had purchased at least one bundle to complete the survey (94% had purchased at 
least one).  A total of 3,743 customers responded to the request.  The respondents’ demographics 
reflect those of the average video game consumer with an average age of 25 years and a majority 
being male at 96%.   
After the respondents were exposed to the fictitious bundles, they were asked to answer several 
questions regarding the price they would pay (How much would you pay, What is your estimate 
of the market price of the bundle, What do you think would be a fair price for the bundle).  These 
questions required a numerical response.  They were also asked about their purchase intentions 
(If I was going to buy games I would probably buy the example bundle of games, I would 
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consider buying the example bundle of games, The likelihood that I would purchase the example 
bundle of games is high) and search intentions (If I was considering buying the example bundle 
of games, I would visit other stores that sell games to check prices, I would need to search for 
more information about prices of alternative games, I would visit other stores that sell games for 
a lower price).  These questions were answered on a seven-point Likert-type scale from 1 
(Strongly disagree) to 7 (Strongly agree) (Malhotra and Birks 2007). 
 
5 RESULTS 
This section will demonstrate the results of analysis that allowed the examination of the 
differences between the promotions, as well as the interactions between the different features of 
the PWYW campaigns.   The survey results were analyzed using SPSS software.   
 
5.1 Definition of variables 
5.1.1 Definitions including search intentions 
Factor analysis was used to confirm the research constructs.  After removal of outliers the data 
had good qualifications for executing the analysis (KMO 0.732, p < 0,001) and was subjected to 
principle axis factoring (communalities   >   0,3).  Varimax rotation method with Kaiser 
normalization was used and it was converged in three iterations.  Two factors were revealed 
(Eigenvalue >   1) that represented 67,44 % of the total variation in the data and they loaded on 
the constructs they were intended. Three items (I would visit other stores that sell games for a 
lower price, I would visit other stores that sell games to check their prices, I would need to 
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search for more information about prices of alternative games) loaded highly (average loading = 
0,82) on the first factor that was interpreted as ‘search intentions’ of the promotional offer.  
Three items (The likelihood that I would purchase the example bundle of games is high, I would 
consider buying the example bundle of games, If I was going to buy games I would probably buy 
the example bundle of games) loaded highly (average loading =  0,82) on the second factor that 
was interpreted as ‘purchase intentions’ of the promotional offer.   
 
5.1.2 Definitions without search intentions 
Factor analysis was used to confirm the research construct of purchase intentions without the 
inclusion of search intentions for the purpose of simplicity. After removal of outliers the data had 
good qualifications for executing the analysis (KMO 0.725, p < 0,001) and was subjected to 
principle axis factoring (communalities   >   0,3).  Nine iterations were required.  One factor was 
revealed (Eigenvalue >   1) that represented 66,81 % of the total variation in the data and it 
loaded on the construct it was intended.  Three items (The likelihood that I would purchase the 
example bundle of games is high, I would consider buying the example bundle of games, If I was 
going to buy games I would probably buy the example bundle of games) loaded highly (average 
loading =  0,82) on the factor that was interpreted as ‘purchase intentions’ of the promotional 
offer.   
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5.2 ANOVA Models 
5.2.1 ANOVA including search intentions 
One-way ANOVA models were used to analyze the experimental data.  A preliminary analysis 
of variance was done to see if price (price paid, est. market price, est. fair price), purchase 
intentions, and search intentions vary across the eight different versions of the PWYW 
promotions.  The between-subject factor was the different versions of the promotion. Prices, 
purchase intentions, and search intentions were used as dependent variables. The differences in 
the means of the dependent variables were shown as very statistically significant across the eight 
versions of the promotion: price paid (F= 6.81, p < 0.01), estimated market price (F= 81.33, p < 
0.01), estimated fair price (F= 31.10, p < 0.01).  In the case of purchase intentions, the 
differences were also statistically significant (F= 2.09, p < 0.05). The differences were not 
significant in the case of search intentions. 
ANOVA models were then conducted.  Analysis of variance was conducted five times using 
price paid, estimated market price, estimated fair price, search intentions, and purchase intentions 
as dependent variables.  The between-subject factor for all of the models were reference price 
(high/low), availability, (short time period/long time period), and anonymity 
(public/anonymous).  The results of the five ANOVA models are presented in table 1. 
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Table 1. ANOVA Result with search intentions factor 
 
          
  Dependent variable 
 Price Market price Fair price Purchase intentions Search intentions 
Source of variation F-statistic F-statistic F-statistic F-statistic F-statistic 
Interaction (A x B x C) 6,81 ** 81,33 ** 31,10 ** 2,06 * 1.53 
Reference price (A) 38,72 ** 556,22 ** 206,51 ** 0.42 0.36 
Availability (B) 2.23 21,92 ** 4,53 * 1.12 0.29 
Anonymity (C) 0.76 0.66 0.53 0.42 0.52 
            
Notes: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01     
      
      The triple interaction between reference price, availability, and anonymity was shown as very 
significant (p < .01) in the cases of price, market price, and fair price and as significant (p < .05) 
in the case of purchase intentions.  For the individual promotion features, reference price had 
statistically very significant impact on three of the cases: price (H1a: F = 38.72, p < .01), market 
price (F = 556.22, p < .01), and fair price (F = 206.51, p < .01).  The promotion feature of 
availability also had very significant impact on market price (F = 21.92, p < .01) and significant 
impact on fair price (F = 4.53, p < .05).  As presented in table 3, the highest mean (= 11.62 
dollars) for the price variable was the combination public x high reference price x short 
availability (H4a supported).   The lowest price mean (= 8.64 dollars) was for the combination 
anonymous x low reference price x short availability.  Purchase intentions were highest with the 
combination anonymous x high reference price x short availability.  Search intentions were 
highest with the combination anonymous x low reference price x short availability. 
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5.2.2 ANOVA without search intentions  
One-way ANOVA models were used to analyze the experimental data.  A preliminary analysis 
of variance was done to see if price (price paid, est. market price, est. fair price) and purchase 
intentions varies across the eight different versions of the PWYW promotions.  The between-
subject factor was the different versions of the promotion, and prices and purchase intentions 
were used as dependent variables. The differences in the means of the dependent variables were 
shown as very statistically significant across the eight versions of the promotion: price paid (F= 
6.81, p < 0.01), estimated market price (F= 81.33, p < 0.01), estimated fair price (F= 31.10, p < 
0.01).  In the case of purchase intentions, the differences were also statistically significant (F= 
2.09, p < 0.05). 
ANOVA models were then conducted.  Analysis of variance was conducted four times using 
price paid, estimated market price, estimated fair price, and purchase intentions as dependent 
variables.  The between-subject factor for all of the models were reference price (high/low), 
availability, (short time period/long time period), and anonymity (public/anonymous).  The 
results of the four ANOVA models are presented in table 2.  
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Table 2. ANOVA Result without search intentions factor 
 
        
  Dependent variable 
 Price Market price Fair price 
Purchase 
intentions 
Source of variation F-statistic F-statistic F-statistic F-statistic 
Interaction (A x B x 
C) 6,81 ** 81,33 ** 31,10 ** 2,09 * 
Reference price (A) 38,72 ** 556,22 ** 206,51 ** 0,42 
Availability (B) 2,23 21,92 ** 4,53 * 1,12 
Anonymity (C) 0,76 0,66 0,53 0,42 
          
Notes: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01  
 
 
 
The triple interaction between reference price, availability, and anonymity was shown as very 
significant (p < .01) in the cases of price, market price, and fair price and as significant (p < .05) 
in the case of purchase intentions.  For the individual promotion features, reference price had 
statistically very significant impact on three of the cases: price (H1a: F = 38.72, p < .01), market 
price (F = 556.22, p < .01), and fair price (F = 206.51, p < .01).  The promotion feature of 
availability also had very significant impact on market price (F = 21.92, p < .01) and significant 
impact on fair price (F = 4.53, p < .05).  As presented in table 3, the highest mean (= 11.62 
dollars) for the price variable was the combination public x high reference price x short 
availability (H4a supported).   The lowest price mean (= 8.64 dollars) was for the combination 
anonymous x low reference price x short availability.  Purchase intentions were highest with the 
combination anonymous x high reference price x short availability.   
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Figure 3. The nature of the Reference price x Promotion availability x Anonymity of the 
payment -interaction as for the Price consumer would pay 
 
 
Figure 3 shows the output of the nature of the anonymity x reference price x availability 
interaction means of price.   The first plot represents the anonymous promotion output and the 
second represents the public promotion output.  The higher mean represents a higher price that 
they would pay for the promotion bundle.  The interaction means patterns represent the impact of 
the reference price on both public and anonymous promotions.  Both promotions interaction 
patterns clearly demonstrate how consumer would pay higher prices when the displayed 
reference price is high.  The low reference price is shown to not lower price paid as drastically in 
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the anonymous setting as in the public setting when the promotion is available for a long period 
of time.  Plots for fair price and market price reflected similar trends with little variation between 
anonymous and public promotion offerings. 
 
Figure 4. The nature of the Reference price x Promotion availability x Anonymity of the 
payment -interaction as for Purchase intentions
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Figure 4 shows the output of the nature of the anonymity x reference price x availability 
interaction means in relation to purchase intentions measure.  The first plot represents the 
anonymous promotion output and the second plot represents the public promotion output.  The 
higher mean represents greater purchase intentions.  Again, both plots reveal that the amount of 
availability of the promotion is relevant for purchase intentions.  For anonymous promotions, 
long availability creates more purchase intentions.  However if the reference price is high, short 
availability creates slightly more purchase intentions.  When the promotion was public, long 
availability created more desire to purchase.  However, when the reference price was low and 
there was short availability of the promotion, purchase intentions were slightly higher than those 
for long availability. Overall there were more purchase intentions in the anonymous promotion 
than in the public promotion which was negligible.   
 
Figure 5. The nature of the Reference price x Promotion availability x Anonymity of the 
payment -interaction as for Search intentions 
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Figure 5 shows the output of the nature of the anonymity x reference price x availability 
interaction means in relation to the search intention measure.   The first plot represents the 
anonymous promotion output and the second represents the public promotion output.  The higher 
mean represents greater search intentions.  The amount of availability is shown to be relevant in 
both cases of search intentions.  When the promotion is anonymous, long availability of the 
promotion creates less desire to search for alternatives or better prices. However, if the reference 
price is high, long availability creates slightly more search intentions.  The interaction pattern of 
the public promotion shows that short availability of the promotion will lead to very low search 
intentions, as people will want to purchase immediately.  When the promotion is available for a 
long period of time, there is always some intention to search.   
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6 DISCUSSION 
With innovative new selling techniques such as PWYW and other participative and dynamic 
pricing, there has been little research of consumer responses to promotional offers.  This paper 
hopes to provide insight into the framing aspects of the promotion that can be manipulated to 
encourage positive response.  The interactions between the three framing features revealed 
interesting results.  Of the eight versions of the PWYW promotion, the highest price paid was 
indeed for the one that displayed a high reference price, was public, and was available for less 
time. This was consistent with our predicted best combination of framing features. The 
promotion that resulted in the highest purchase intentions was the one that was anonymous, had 
the highest reference price, and a short period of availability.  This was contradictory to our 
predictions for highest purchase intentions combination of features.  The interaction of the 
features creates a frame where consumers have short period of time to buy a high perceived 
value item with ease and no guilt of paying a small amount.  
 
6.1 Reference Price – Most influential variable, but regulated by other information 
variables 
Reference price was indeed the most prominent influencing factor that we changed throughout 
our experiment.  With respect to the price paid by consumers, the controlled variable of 
displayed reference price had a significant positive impact.  This supports previous research 
findings showing the internal reference price of the consumer was increased due to the external 
framing cue of a high reference price (Grewal et al. 1998) and that this internal reference price 
translates to higher prices paid (Kim et al. 2009).  With respect to purchase intentions of the 
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consumer, reference price did not have a significant impact.  Kannan and Kopalle (2001) showed 
how reference prices in the form of price expectations play an important role in choice processes 
and our research clearly shows reference price changing consumer reactions.  This internal 
reference price was shown as being positively influenced by perceived quality, advertised selling 
price, and advertised reference price by Grewal et al. (1998).  We assumed the perceived quality 
in our example promotion to be of good quality as it was a previously successful product launch.  
Our advertised sale price was negligible because it was whatever the consumer desired to pay 
and the reference price was the price we provided in the example promotion.  The consumers’ 
internal reference price based on past purchases and knowledge and based on our provided 
contextual reference price was indeed positively influenced by our manipulations of the 
experiment.  This follows Gwebu et al.  (2001) who showed that framing reference prices have 
an anchor affect on consumers’ value and bid estimations in name your own price mechanisms.  
Because the price is anything they want to pay, it automatically falls within the range that they 
deem acceptable (Kannan and Kopalle 2001) and the reference price then determines how much 
they will pay.  
Chandrashekaran and Grewal (2003) showed that in low involvement situations consumers are 
more likely to depend on the additional cues available to influence their internal reference price.  
As our study and participative pricing situations in general are high involvement, this could 
explain why the posted reference prices that we manipulated did positively influence prices paid, 
but did not result in prices paid being similar to the reference prices.  Prices paid were all 
generally considerably lower than the reference prices posted indicating that the consumers 
already have an accurate internal reference price.  Higher reference prices did indeed result in 
higher prices paid, however they did not stray far from this already present internal reference 
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price.  This follows Chernev (2003) who showed that less knowledgeable consumers need a 
posted reference price to serve as a benchmark when trying to articulate value in monetary terms.  
Our participants had previously purchased multiple similar products in real life situation and 
therefore already had a heavily engrained internal reference price.  Price paid were again 
positively influenced but remained near what we assume to be the participants internal reference 
price.   
Wolk and Spann (2008) showed similar results showing that sellers only have limited ability to 
affect bid values through provision of a reference price.  This externally provided reference price 
plays a more important role when in a situation of product uncertainty.  Even in situations of 
product certainty though, the reference price can still influence the process of bid formation and 
influence purchase and search intentions.  Our study involved a product of somewhat known 
value to the consumers and reference price was shown to still influence the prices paid and 
purchase and search intentions.  The interaction effect of our framing variables also shows that 
final price paid does rely on several sources of information including internal and external 
reference prices as well as availability and anonymity.  Our results agree with Kamins et al. 
(2004) study showing that price paid was indeed higher when a higher external reference price 
was provided.  Final price paid was shown to be a function of acquisition and transaction value 
as well as the selling price and internal and external reference prices (McKechnie et al. 2012).   
 
6.2 Availability – Little individual influence, but has interactive affect 
With respect to search intentions, none of the variables had a significant impact probably due to 
the fact that there is no better price or similar promotion as this unique offer. The promotional 
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availability was significant on the estimated market and fair prices, but was not as significant on 
the price paid or on purchase or search intentions of the consumer.   This follows previous 
research showing scarcity of a promotion as increasing consumers’ perceived value of the 
transaction, but that it is also mediated by the consumers’ internal reference price as well as other 
variables (Inman et al. 1997).  Availability of the promotion was shown to not have an individual 
effect on consumer responses however it did have pull when combined with the other experiment 
variables.  Most research on promotion availability has consisted of traditional time limited 
promotional offers, but have provided similar results.  Inman et al. (1997) showed that 
restrictions in promotions increase perceived unavailability or scarcity of the offer and this 
increased the perceived transaction value.  This offer is then evaluated in conjunction with their 
internal reference price.   Our research adds to this, showing that the correct combination of 
framing aspects including reference price and limited availability do in fact influence consumers’ 
purchase decisions.  Devlin et al. (2007) showed that time-limited promotions encourage 
consumers to end additional searches for information limiting their exposure to competition and 
forcing them to purchase.  Our study showed short availability as leading to low search 
intentions when the payment was public.  When anonymous, short availability of the promotion 
led to less search intentions when the reference price was high.   Perhaps the influence of seeing 
others purchasing the product combined with a short time to purchase creates a higher perceived 
scarcity of the product.  When there is long availability and it is anonymous then people feel they 
have time to seek outside information before returning to purchase without outside pressure.  
Limiting the duration had an accelerating effect on purchases made (Aggerwal and Vaidyanathan 
2003) when the offer was public.  The restriction on the offer could also have increased the 
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scarcity of the offer itself (Aggerwal et al. 2011) and we also showed that it did have an effect on 
the estimated market price and fair price.  However this did not translate into higher prices paid.   
 
6.3 Anonymity – Little individual influence, but has interactive affect 
Purchase intentions were higher when the purchase was anonymous rather than public and the 
interaction between the three features had significant impact on them.  Research on payment 
anonymity has not fully covered how its use as a promotional framing aspect can be utilized to 
increase purchases.  Social motivations and physiological needs are the usual basis for 
anonymity studies.  These include studies into anonymous charity donations and purchasing of 
charity linked goods.  Social shopping and the influence of others have been shown to have an 
effect on consumer behavior related to charity linked goods (Proença and Pereira, 2008). Our 
study used the presence of a list of contributors as the anonymity variable in our experiment and 
it was shown to have an effect on consumers’ purchase behavior when combined with the other 
two variables.  The anonymity of the purchase variable alone was shown to have little significant 
impact on both price and intentions.  This non-significance of anonymity could be due to the 
extreme prices paid by the displayed top contributors or an artifact of the experiment process.  
We do not know whether consumers were motivated by social needs or symbolic needs (Foxall 
and Goldsmith 1994).  We also do not know if paying more than the minimum in PWYW 
situations is due to people caring about their self-images (Gneezy et al. 2011) or due to the many 
other information variables available.  Glazer and Konrad (1996) showed that consumers are 
more willing to donate to an organization the more likely is the intended audience is to hear 
about the decision.  The minimal influence of our anonymity variable could be due to the fact 
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that it was not a real life purchase situation where the intended organization would notice the 
amount paid and where real time updates of top contributor lists and information are available.  
Consumers could not actually show their motivations to pay and could not therefore actually 
improve upon their self-image.  This also follows Ariely et al. (2009) who showed that people 
desire to be seen by others when they are doing ‘good’. 
  Dictator games have given a little more insight into how people are motivated by the presence 
of others and the amount of knowledge each party has. When dictators cannot hide behind 
anonymity they feel urged to give something but do not feel obliged to give more (Engel 2011).  
Our study also showed similar interaction pattern results.  Anonymity had no significant effect 
on price paid for the product offered or on purchase intentions by itself.  It did however have an 
effect on purchase intentions when combined with the other framing variables.  However our 
results show that consumers generally had higher purchase intentions when the payment was 
anonymous.  This could be due to the fact that they do not feel obliged to pay a lot when it is 
anonymous and therefore many more will purchase, but at a lower price.  Alpizar et al. (2007) 
showed that people tend to increase their contributions if it is observable that other participants 
did also.  Non-anonymous tests resulted in higher contributions, but in terms of reciprocity it 
increases probability of contributing but lowers total contribution.  We show that anonymity did 
not have an effect on price paid, but did in fact lower purchase intentions when the payment was 
public.  The contextual cue of anonymity did play a role in shifting consumer responses to the 
offer, but not a significant one.  Perhaps our chosen experimental variable was not properly 
applied.  Haley and Foster (2005) stated that there are many types of input relevant to questions 
of anonymity and observability and these indeed influence prosocial behavior.  However each 
consumer has a different sensitivity to these inputs.   
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6.4 Dynamic Pricing 
In terms of dynamic pricing, our study of a PWYW situation inherently involved the aspects of 
illusion of control and lateral consumer relationship (Lee et al. 2011).  Illusion of control 
involves intention to achieve the outcome and the perceived connection between ones actions 
and the desired outcomes.  Because the consumers studied all participated in the study they felt a 
notion of perceived control.  This possibly led to the high level of intent to purchase amongst 
those studied.  The lateral consumer relationship then involves the price perceptions that come 
from comparing the price they paid to the price others paid for similar products (Lee et al. 2011, 
Thomson 1999). Because our study had no visible comparative price except for the provided 
reference price we do not know the effects of this lateral consumer relationship on our subjects.  
 
6.5 Participative Pricing 
Participative pricing mechanisms such as PWYW also involve elements of consumer control.  
Chandran (2003) showed how strategic use of participative pricing mechanisms can stimulate 
demand.  This can be shown by the real exponential growth of the particular promotional website 
that was studied.  By participating in the pricing, consumers perceive control over the process.  
Because the PWYW process involves such focus on setting the final price, consumers focus on 
that rather than evaluating the deal itself.  Consumers who view the studied PWYW website, 
they generally always have some intent to purchase, even if at the minimum price.  Those that 
have participated in the past then generally prefer participative pricing to normal pricing settings 
(Chandran and Morwitz 2005).  This can be shown through the high number of repeat purchasers 
from our survey results.    
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6.6 PWYW – Consumers can be influenced by framing variables to pay more than the 
minimum 
Name your own price mechanism studies have shown that consumers choose to participate 
because they of the lack of frictional costs associated with online transactions (Hann and 
Terwiesch 2003).  The PWYW setting that we studied also involved zero frictional costs.   With 
no added fees and with one touch payment options currently available, the process of purchasing 
the supplied PWYW bundles is minimal.  This could explain the high purchase intentions and 
repeat purchasers as shown in our study.  Because consumers also have full control, as with all 
PWYW mechanisms, they tended to demonstrate high purchase intentions (Chandran and 
Morwitz 2005) with our study as well.  The mindset of the consumer can be manipulated through 
the framing of the promotion to be more implemental.  Consumers who visit the studied website 
are immediately drawn to the implementation of setting whatever price they desire rather than on 
evaluating the deal or searching for more information.  This could explain the high purchase 
intentions shown.  Consumers then pay the proportion of their internal reference price they are 
willing to discharge (Kim et al. 2009).  Our study showed that the reference price of the 
consumers we studied was indeed influenced positively by the reference price we displayed. 
Because we had a high quality product, it came down to the framing aspects to determine how 
consumers would respond.   
Marett et al. (2012) showed that Social Exchange Theory and the relationship between the seller 
and buyer in PWYW situations is important for long-term success.  Because the consumers who 
participated in our experiment were mostly repeat purchasers from the example website we can 
assume that they seek to repeatedly gain the benefits provided by the website and therefore pay 
more than the minimum.  Paying over zero is shown to signal the vendor that consumer would 
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like the deal again.  Our results showed significant payments well over the minimum, also 
indicating that they would like to purchase again. 
Gneezy et al. (2010) also showed that consumers’ decision to purchase a PWYW product or 
service is moderated by their identity and self-image concerns.  Consumers feel bad when they 
pay less than the ‘appropriate price’ causing them to pass on the opportunity.  Our results show 
high purchase intentions, despite the actual amount to be paid.  This could be due to the online 
environment where consumers do not have to be concerned about others seeing them pay lower 
than the recommended price.  Willingness to pay could then be a result of issues of right and 
wrong and fairness rather than standard economic concepts as shown by Levitt (2006). 
This follows Regner (2010) who showed that consumers in online PWYW situations are highly 
influenced by issues such as reciprocity and guilt.  Our participants had no self-image risks or 
social norms to follow and were most likely also influenced by issues of reciprocity and guilt as 
well as internal reference price and external cues.   
Gautier and Van der Klauuw (2010) stated that PWYW pricing situations require loyal fans for 
success.  Our study involved avid consumers of the example website who can be shown to be 
loyal fans who wish to pay more than the minimum to make sure the promotions are always 
available.   
 
6.7 Framing – Multiple framing variables in the same promotion have an interactive affect 
The decision frame as described by Tversky and Kahnemann (1981) is controlled by the 
formulation of the problem as well as by the norms and personal characteristics of the consumer.  
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Consumers generally choose according to what they perceive to give them the highest expected 
utility.  However, consumers do not always make rational decisions and are highly influenced by 
contextual cues in information provided by price offers (Sinha and Smith 2000).  Our study also 
showed that consumers are highly sensitive to contextual cues and the proper framing of the 
promotion will indeed lead to greater price paid and purchase intentions and less search 
intentions.  However choosing the correct combination of features can be a difficult undertaking.  
Levin et al. (1998) studied framing effects showing three types of framing effects that are 
governed by different process and therefore independent of each other.  Our study involved the 
use of multiple framing cues to show how these independent variables can have an interactive 
effect on price paid and purchase intentions.  McKechnie et al. (2012) showed that framing 
effects of discount presentation in comparative price advertising have an effect on transaction 
value and purchase intentions in low-price product contexts.  Our study involved what we 
believe to be a low-priced product, and prices paid and purchase intentions were indeed 
influenced by the factors which we controlled.  Gendall et al. (2006) stated that when price or 
price discount is the only available information cue, it can be overemphasized in their responses.  
Because our study included a provided reference price as well as other information cues, the 
resulting prices paid did not show overemphasis of this reference price, but did show that it had 
some influence.  The price paid was positively influenced by reference price manipulations, but 
was regulated by the other information cues as well as the consumers’ internal reference prices.   
This follows Inman et al. (1997) who showed that the effect of value information cues such as 
restrictions are not unified across all conditions because the effect is modified by the presence of 
other framing variables.   
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7 CONCLUSION AND MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS 
Existing research into PWYW pricing mechanisms and the framing of the promotion must be 
expanded to include its application to digital environments and goods.  This study contributes to 
existing research by offering insight into the online applicability of PWYW promotions.  The 
previous successes of the studied online PWYW promotion already show it can indeed be 
profitable for companies.  Digital goods are easily distributed and online transaction effort is 
minimal, allowing for effortless implementation of the pricing mechanism.  The desire for 
companies implementing PWYW mechanisms online (and offline) then becomes a question of 
attracting new customers and getting them to pay more than the minimum price.  The results of 
this study provide insight into how the framing of the promotion can lead to increased purchase 
intentions and prices paid.   
External reference price cues provided by the displayed promotion do tend to increase the end 
price paid.  Consumers’ internal reference prices can be increased due to manipulation of 
external reference price (Grewal et al. 1998). By increasing the displayed reference price, we 
were able to positively influence the final prices paid by the consumer.  We do not know if the 
higher reference price actually translated to an increase of the internal reference prices of the 
consumers or if the proportion of their internal reference price that they were willing to discharge 
to the seller increased (Kim et al. 2009).  Increasing reference price displayed on the promotion 
will induce higher prices paid either way.   This external reference price however will not 
completely determine the range of prices that consumers will pay.  Participants in our survey 
were extremely knowledgeable about the product and were all accustomed to using this PWYW 
service.  Average prices paid in previous real-life PWYW situations from the example website 
were very similar to the average prices paid in our experiment. This shows that the consumers 
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did not veer far from the internal reference prices that they had utilized in the past when 
determining price to pay. We were still able to increase the final prices paid by increasing the 
displayed reference price even if only slightly (Wolk and Spann 2008).  This indicates that even 
highly knowledgeable consumers with experience in PWYW situations can be induced to pay 
more.  Higher reference price can be utilized in promotions of all types as long as they are 
believable and not overinflated (Gwebu et al 2011).  Our chosen reference prices were examples 
already utilized by the example website and chosen due to their believability. 
Having a scarcity restriction has been shown to increase consumers’ perceived value of an offer, 
but the effects are mediated by other information variables such as internal reference price 
(Inman et al. 1997).  Our results indicate that scarcity did not have an individual effect on our 
knowledgable consumer base.  Having already established accurate internal reference prices did 
not allow for much increase of value perceptions due to the increased scarcity.  Limiting the 
availability did however have an interactive effect when mediated by the other available 
information variables.  It did have a tendency to lessen search intentions and increase purchase 
intentions (Devlin et al. 2007, Aggerwal and Vaidyanathan 2003).  Increasing scarcity did 
increase fair and market prices of the consumers but did not increase significantly the final prices 
paid.  Availability restrictions can be utilized in PWYW situations to increase purchase 
intentions and perhaps value perceptions, but final price paid will indeed be heavily mediated by 
internal reference price and other variables. 
Anonymity also did not have a significant individual effect on prices paid by the consumers.  We 
expected non-anonymous payments to have higher average prices paid than anonymous ones 
(Glazer and Konrad 1996, Ariley et al. 2009).  Our results indicated that anonymity did not 
change prices paid, but did have an interactive effect on purchase intentions and price.  When 
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payments are to be made publicly, it tended to lower purchase intentions.  Consumers do not 
wish to participate if they are going to be seen making small contributions.  If the PWYW want 
mechanism is anonymous, people will be more likely to contribute, but at smaller amounts 
(Engel 2011).   
The interaction of reference price, limited availability, and anonymity also affects the reactions 
of consumers and should be discussed before implementing any pricing strategy including 
PWYW.  Choosing the right combination to maximize purchase intentions and the price 
consumers pay is necessary for a successful PWYW promotional launch.  These framing aspects 
as well as many others must be taken into consideration before implementation can begin.  
Having multiple framing variables within the same promotion will undoubtedly have an 
interactive effect on the promotions effectiveness in translating to more purchases and higher 
prices paid.  Consumers are highly influenced by contextual cues in price offers (Sinha and 
Smith 2000) including purchasers of PWYW offers.  Reference price had the only individual 
effect on the prices paid by our participants, but there was also an interactive effect between our 
information variables that influenced purchase decisions and search intentions.  The effects of 
the value information cues and other framing variables are not unified across all conditions 
(Inman et al. 1997).  The effects of information cues are modified by the other framing variables 
as well as by the participants’ internal reference prices and previous experiences.  By 
understanding the targeted consumer group, promotional framing cues can be utilized 
successfully.  Multiple framing cues can be combined in such a way that they have an increased 
positive impact on consumer responses than when utilized individually.  Multiple framing cues 
when combined correctly can increase purchase intentions and prices paid while at the same time 
lessen search intentions for other information.   
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PWYW pricing mechanisms are perfectly suited for digital goods and online marketplaces.  The 
innovativeness of the new digital pricing mechanism stands as an initial attracting point for 
online shoppers.  Having access to millions of consumers online allows for the possibility of 
attracting a huge base of purchasing consumers.  Promotion of the PWYW product and webpage 
does not only include the use of standard online marketing tools to gain customer awareness.  
The differentiated pricing and perceived control by the buyer, are cause for the spreading of 
awareness through other means such as word of mouth.  Once a large number of consumers are 
attracted to the promotion, the framing of the offer can lead to a great increase in the price paid 
and the purchase intentions.  By increasing the price paid and the purchase percentage rate of 
those that view the promotion, the seller can greatly reduce the risk of not breaking even.  Once 
consumers view a PWYW offer that they are interested in, their mindset should be shifted to be 
more implemental rather than to evaluate the deal characteristics (Chandran and Morwitz 2005).  
Our consumers were repeat purchasers from the example website and our results of high 
purchase intentions reflected that they enjoy the product and process.  Consumers then must rely 
on framing information to influence their value perceptions of the offer and process.  They then 
pay the proportion of their new internal reference price to the seller that they are willing to 
discharge (Kim et al. 2009).  Increasing reference price within a believable range, can induce 
either increase in value perception, internal reference price, or the proportion of the internal 
reference price willing to discharge.  This final amount paid however is heavily mediated by 
other information sources, especially internal reference price.  Social exchange theory and 
feelings of reciprocity also come into play (Marett et al. 2012, Regner 2010).  There is no actual 
risk of losing face or hurting the self-image in online PWYW situations.  Consumers must be 
motivated by ideas of reciprocity and a desire to receive the same type of offer again (Marett et 
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al. 2012).  In order for a PWYW promotion to be successful long-term,  they need to have a loyal 
following of consumers that are willing to show their appreciation by paying more than the 
minimum (Gautier and Van der Klauuw 2010).  Successfully offering a quality good under 
PWYW conditions will lead to increased brand awareness and appreciation of the good being 
sold and of the purchase process itself.  Consumers who appreciate the goods and the transaction 
process will generally be likely to make repeat purchases under the same format.   
 
8 LIMITATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
Our experiment studied the interaction effect of three framing variables on consumers’ purchase 
decisions in a PWYW situation.  Due to the limitations of the survey we only studied the effects 
of all three variables of reference price, availability, and anonymity together and we could not 
study the effects of having just two of the variables present.  Further research into framing 
aspects could focus for example, on the double interaction effect of just reference price and 
anonymity or on just anonymity and availability together.  These undoubtedly would have 
different impacts on consumer responses.  The individual effects of anonymity and availability 
could have been overwhelmed by the significant effects of reference price.  They could have had 
stronger effects had reference price been removed.   
Our study did not go into depth into the understanding of perceived control of the participants of 
the experiment.  Further research needs to be done to realize the true impact of this perceived 
control.  Our study did not display the prices paid by other consumers for the same example 
product and therefore there was no comparable price for presence of lateral consumer 
relationships.  This undoubtedly would have affected the outcomes of consumer responses to the 
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promotion.  Our study did utilize the framing aspect of displayed reference price and this had a 
great significance on consumer responses.  However, due to the need for survey simplicity, we 
only utilized two variables for reference price, one high and one low.  The higher reference price 
did indeed positively influence the price paid by consumers, but it would be interesting to know 
the limits to which this applies.  Further research needs to be completed to determine at what 
extremes the reference price becomes unrealistic.  Too high and it can be perceived as grossly 
exaggerated or create a sense of distrust.  Too low a reference price and the product offered 
could be seen as of low quality.  We also do not know if the increased prices paid due to 
increased external reference price occurred because of an increase in internal reference price or 
because of an increase in the proportion of that internal reference price they were willing to 
discharge.   
This study was conducted under experimental conditions that utilized framing aspects taken from 
an existing PWYW retailer.  Customers evaluated and answered questions about a fictional 
PWYW promotion that resulted in no actual purchase being made.  We also had no access to past 
purchase behavior of the participating consumers.  Future research can extend the current 
research by studying responses and purchase data of real-world PWYW situations that result in 
actual purchases.  The framing promotional display items were chosen by the company and have 
proved to be successful for the type of digital goods that they sell (video games).  The results of 
this study are shown to affect the type of customers who are actively seeking new video games.  
It is unclear whether these framing aspects will have the same effect on consumers of other 
digital or physical goods.  Future research of digital PWYW promotions should include 
situations where consumers are not active seekers of the product being sold.  Different framing 
cue combinations should also be studied across a variety of goods.  These different goods should 
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be of different product categories as well as in different price ranges.  Other aspects besides 
reference price, availability, and anonymity would inevitably impact consumer reactions to 
PWYW promotions and should also be tested.  The experiment of consumer responses to 
framing aspects of a PWYW promotion was conducted in a virtual online environment and has 
yet to be tested in physical locations and settings.   
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